HMFEv is a new multivariate signature scheme proposed at PQCrypto 2017. This is a vinegar variant of multi-HFE (Chen et al., 2008) . While the original multi-HFE is known to be insecure against the direct attack (Huang et al., 2015), the min-rank attack (Bettale et al., 2013) and the attack using a diagonalization approach (Hashimoto, 2017), HMFEv is considered to be secure enough against these attacks. However, the security against the high-rank attack had not been studied at all. In the present paper, we study the structure of HMFEv and discuss its security against the high-rank attack.
Introduction
The multi-HFE [1] is one of public key cryptosystems whose public keys are sets of multivariate quadratic forms over finite fields. The quadratic forms in multi-HFE are generated by a set of multivariate quadratic forms over an extension field of the basic field. Unfortunately, the multi-HFE is known to be insecure against the direct attack [2] , the min-rank attack [3] and the attack using a diagonalization approach [4] .
Recently in PQCrypto 2017, a vinegar variant of multi-HFE, called HMFEv, was proposed by Petzoldt et al. [5] . This vinegar variant succeeds to enhance the security against the known attacks [2] [3] [4] and then HMFEv had been expected to be one of signature schemes, secure and efficient enough under suitable parameter selections [5] (see Table 1 ). However, the security against the high-rank attack had not been studied yet at all.
In this paper, we study the structure of HMFEv and discuss the security of HMFEv against the high-rank attack. Based on the results of our experiments given in Table 2 , we can conclude that the security of HMFEv is much less than expected.
Multi-HFE and HMFEv
In this section, we describe the constructions of multi-HFE [1] and HMFEv [5] .
Multi-HFE
Let n, N, r ≥ 1 be integers with n = Nr and q a power of prime. Denote by k a finite field of order q and K an rextension of k. Define the quadratic map G :
The secret key is a pair of two invertible affine maps S, T : k n → k n and the public key is the quadratic map
The plain-text p ∈ k n is given by S −1 (φ −1 N (X)). To find X with (1), one needs to solve a system of N quadratic equations of N variables. Since the complexity of solving it is in exponential for N (see e.g. [6, 7] ), the number N can not be taken large.
HMFEv
Let n, m, N, r, v ≥ 1 be integers with m := Nr, n := m + v and q a power of prime. Denote by k the finite field of order q and K the r-extension of k. Define the map G :
The secret key is a pair of two invertible affine maps 31  44  36  2  18  8  80bit  256  39  27  3  9  12  80bit  31  68  56  2  28  12  128bit  256  61  45  3  15  16  128bit  31  97  80  2  40  17  192bit  256  90  69  3  23  21  192bit  31 131  110  2  55  21  256bit  256  119  93  3  31  26  256bit to-one maps.
In the signature scheme HMFEv, a given message
The signature for
To find X with (3), one needs to solve a system of N quadratic equations of N variables. Then, similar to the multi-HFE, the number N cannot be large since the complexity of solving it is exponential for N . In [5] (see Table 1 ), Petzeldt et al. selected the parameters of HMFEv with N = 2, 3 as a signature scheme secure and efficient enough for practical use.
We note that the constant parts of S, T do not contribute to enhance the security. In fact, for
N,v is also a quadratic map similar to (2). Then we can consider that S, T are linear maps without loss of generality.
Security analysis
In this section, we study the structure of HMFEv and discuss the security against the rank attacks. We first study the structures of polynomials in HMFEv.
Polynomials in HMFEv
For integers n 1 , n 2 ≥ 1 and a finite field k, let M n 1 ,n 2 (k) be the set of n 1 × n 2 matrices of k-entries. Denote by I n ∈ M n,n (k) the identity matrix and by 0 n1,n2 ∈ M n1,n2 (k) the zero matrix. For simplicity, we write M n (k) := M n,n (k) and 0 n := 0 n,n . For an integer l ≥ 1 and a matrix A = (a ij ) i,j , we denote by
given by the matrices Θ N and Θ N,v respectively. In fact, it holds
Then the public key F is described by
When we express the polynomials
as quadratic forms of X, u with matrices
written as quadratic polynomials of
This means that the quadratic forms in the public key are expressed by
where
In the next two subsections, we discuss the security of HMFEv against the rank attacks based on these facts.
Min-rank attack
Let F 1 , . . . , F m be the coefficient matrices of the quadratic forms f 1 (x), . . . , f m (x) respectively. The min-rank attack, introduced by Kipnis-Shamir [8] and developed by Bettale et al. [3] , is an attack to recover T (partially) by finding α 1 , . . . , α m ∈ K such that the rank of H := α 1 F 1 + · · · + α m F m is at most R if there exist such α 1 , . . . , α m ∈ K and an integer 1 ≤ R < n. For HMFEv, due to (4) and (5), we see that there exist such α 1 , . . . , α m ∈ K with R = N + v and H is one of the following forms with high probability.
Once such a matrix H is given, the attacker can recover keys equivalent to (S, T ) easily (see [3] ).
To find such α 1 , . . . , α m ∈ K, the attacker generates a system of polynomial equations of m variables z 1 , . . . , z m derived from the condition that the rank of  H(z 1 , . . . , z m ) := z 1 F 1 +· · ·+z m F m is at most N +v and solve it by, e.g., the Gröbner basis algorithm. Since the condition that the rank of A is at most R is equivalent that the determinants of arbitrary (R + 1) × (R + 1)-minor matrices in A are zero, the min-rank attack requires to solve a system of polynomial equations of degree (at most) N + v + 1 and of m variables. Based on the result in [3] , the authors in [5] claimed that the complexity of the min-rank attack is O m+N +v+1 N +v+1 w where 2 ≤ w < 3 is an exponent of the Gaussian elimination. This means that, if one takes v sufficiently large, HMFEv is secure enough against the min-rank attack.
High-rank attack
The high-rank attack, introduced in [9, 10] , is to find
. . , F m are as written in (6) . Due to (4) and (5), we see that the first N columns and lows of the central matrix in (6) are derived from linear sums of N polynomials G 1 (X, u) , . . . , G N (X, u). Then, removing the contributions of such N polynomials, we can get a matrix of rank at most n − N . This means that the high-rank attack is available on HMFEv with (L, R) = (N, n − N ). We now describe how to recover an equivalent key of HMFEv. Input. The public matrices
Step 2. Find a matrix Q ∈ M n,N (K) with P Q = 0 n,N .
Step 3. Choose Q 0 ∈ M n,v (k) randomly and put
Step 4. Find a matrix W = (w ij ) i,j ∈ M N,m (K) with
is not invertible, change W . NW . We explain why this attack recovers an equivalent key. As discussed before, there exist β 1 , . . . , β N ∈ K in Step 1 and we can easily check that P is one of the following forms with high probability.
Since P is of rank at most n − N , there exists a matrix Q in Step 2 and it can be found by linear operations. Due to (7), we see that a matrixQ = (Q, * )
or its permutation. Lemma 3.2 in [4] tells that the matrixQ in Step 3 is in M n (k)Θ
Since F l is a linear sum of matrices similar to the coefficient matrices given in (5), a matrix W in Step 4 exists and it is found by linear operations. The matrices F 1 , . . . , F N are similar to the coefficient matrices of
Step 5 is an equivalent key. It is easy to see that Step 2-5 require only linear operations. Then the complexity of Step 1 is important in this attack. To find β 1 , . . . , β N in Step 1, we state a system of polynomial equations of N variables y 1 , . . . , y N derived from the condition that the rank of
is at most n − N and solve it by, e.g., the Gröbner basis algorithm. Since this condition is equivalent that the determinants of arbitrary (n − N + 1) × (n − N + 1)-minor matrices of P (y 1 , . . . , y N ) are zero, the attacker needs to solve a system of polynomial equations of degree at most n − N + 1 and of N variables. Then we can consider that the complexity of the high-rank attack on HMFEv highly depends on N and the contribution of v for the security seems not too much.
Note that, for integers M 1 , N 1 , d ≥ 1 with M 1 ≥ N 1 and a semi-regular system of polynomials {p 1 (x), . . . , p M 1 (x)} of N 1 -variables and of degree d, it is known (e.g. [6, 7] ) that the complexity of the Gröbner basis algorithm on this polynomial system is bounded by O 
for the polynomial system in the high-rank attack and M 1 can be taken at most n n−N +1 2 . Remark that (8) is the number of operations on K and then the real running time seems at most (r log q) 2 times larger than (8) . While, on this paper, we avoid to give a concrete proof for the estimate (8) of the high-rank attack, we consider that (8) is not far from the real complexity of the high-rank attack.
Experiments of the high-rank attack
We implemented the high-rank attack on HMFEv by Magma [11] ver.2.22-3 on Windows 8.1, Core(TM)i7-4800MQ, 2.70GHz for the parameters in Table 1 ( [5] ). In our implementation, we first choose an integer M sufficiently larger than N , and generate M equations of N variables (y 1 , . . . , y N ) by the determinants of (n − N + 1) × (n − N + 1) minor matrices of P (y 1 , . . . , y N ). Next, we find a common solution (y 1 , . . . , y N ) = (β 1 , . . . , β N ) of such M equations by the Gröbner basis algorithm. Finally, we check whether the rank of P (β 1 , . . . , β N ) is at most n − N .
Remark that the Gaussian elimination is not efficient to compute a determinant of a polynomial matrix of large size. We then used an algorithm introduced in [12] instead of the Gaussian elimination for computations of polynomial matrices.
We also remark that, if q is even, we use
is symmetric and skew-symmetric since the field k is of even characteristic. It is known (e.g. [13] ) that the determinant of a skew-symmetric matrix is zero when the size of the matrix is odd and is a square when that is even. We then have to arrange our attack based on this fact. Fortunately, the arrangement for even characteristic cases was already discussed in [3] for the min-rank attack and we can apply it also for the high-rank attack.
We describe the running times of the high-rank attack in Table 2 by taking M = 3 for (q, N ) = (31, 2) and M = 10 for (q, N ) = (256, 3). These results show that HMFEv with N = 2 is not secure at all. While the complexities for the cases of N = 3 is much more than the cases of N = 2, we can consider that the security is far from 80 ∼ 256 bit. Though one requires a larger N to generate a secure HMFEv, it lacks the efficiency of signature generation.
Conclusion
The signature scheme HMFEv is a vinegar variant of multi-HFE. It is known [5] that, if the vinegar parameter v is larger, HMFEv against the min-rank attack is exponentially more secure. However, the security against the high-rank attack does not highly depend on v and then HMFEv with the parameters selected in [5] (Table 1) is much less secure than expected. While HMFEv with larger N is secure enough, it lacks the efficiency of the signature generation. We thus conclude that this scheme has a serious trade-off between the security and efficiency.
